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The Prague Spring marked the end of de-Stalinisation in the USSR.1 Over the previous fifteen years, 
the Soviet leadership had searched for ways to rekindle popular faith in the communist system after 
the traumas of Stalinism. Following Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ at the Twentieth Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, rank-and-file party members were 
encouraged to take a more active role in debating and implementing policy. Most prisoners were 
released from the Gulag in the first few years after Stalin’s death as the new leadership relied more 
on persuasion and material incentives, and less on terror and coercion, to mould people into Soviet 
citizens. Censorship was relaxed, though fundamental aspects of the political, social and economic 
system were still beyond criticism in the USSR’s public culture.2 These ambitious attempts to foster 
new forms of ‘participatory citizenship’ were curtailed with Khrushchev’s ouster from the Kremlin in 
October 1964.3 But until the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnev's team still 
saw gradual economic reform and limited intellectual and cultural openings as a means of winning 
popular legitimacy.4   
      The Soviet Union’s relations with Czechoslovakia and other East European satellite states 
reflected the broader dynamics of de-Stalinisation. Czechoslovakia remained politically, militarily and 
economically dependent on the USSR. At the same time, the late 1950s saw the emergence of 
special organisations devoted to promoting new types of transnational contacts between the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia. Their goal was to demonstrate the international success of Soviet-style 
socialism. Soviet travel to Eastern Europe was a particularly important means of fostering faith in the 
communist project among the population of the USSR: trips to the satellite states were meant to 
include ordinary blue-collar workers, eclipsing 'any significant expression of ethnic or national 
difference … in favor of a shared socialist/working class identity'.5 Soviet and Czechoslovak citizens 
engaged with the transnational friendship project for a variety of reasons, ranging from personal 
memories of the Second World War ‘to professional interests to attempts to further transnational 
friendships made in other contexts to a desire for goods and culture unavailable at home’.6  
 2 
      The 1950s and the 1960s also witnessed the rise of new transnational contacts that were beyond 
the Kremlin's control.7 Especially (though not exclusively) in the USSR’s western borderlands, Soviet 
citizens learned about the outside world from western radio stations broadcasting into the country, as 
well as East European newspapers, radio and television. East European broadcasts and publications 
featured items that Soviet censors considered ‘antisocialist’.8  At the same time, the Soviet leadership 
was reluctant to stop the flow of news from the the USSR’s satellite states, lest socialist friendship be 
exposed as a mere propaganda façade. By the late 1960s, Soviet leaders looked upon a fast 
globalising world with apprehension. When Alexander Dubček launched his reforms in 
Czechoslovakia, people in the USSR were surprisingly well-informed about the momentous events 
across their western border. 
      As Soviet citizens commented on the Czechoslovak crisis widely, Thaw-era notions of what it 
meant to be Soviet and what it meant to be socialist crumbled. From the Politburo's perspective, the 
Czechoslovak events were part of a broader international crisis facing communism that encompassed 
student protests in Poland, escalating tensions with China and a break with Nicolae Ceauşescu’s 
socialist Romania.9 In this context, Czechoslovakia represented the most sustained and ambitious 
attempt to reform a regime that very closely resembled the Soviet model. Dubček’s experiment was 
thus a testing ground for Soviet policies and ideas. Commenting on the Prague Spring reforms and 
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, leaders and citizens of the USSR reflected not only on 
their country’s foreign policy, but also on the extent to which it was possible to increase political 
participation, open borders and relax censorship without undermining party control over society and 
inducing instability. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was a clear sign that the Brezhnev 
leadership would no longer pursue or tolerate attempts at democratisation within the bloc’s communist 
parties or in society more broadly. Ambitious attempts to increase citizens’ participation in debating 
and implementing policy thus ended with a bang in August 1968.  
      This clear anti-reformist direction created deep rifts in Soviet society. Some citizens turned to 
illegal means to defend the de-Stalinisation agenda. At the same time, faced with a major crisis of the 
socialist system that challenged Soviet ideas of progress, leaders of the USSR were able to rally 
many citizens around the idea that Soviet interests had to be protected against the supposed chaos 
emanating from Eastern Europe, as well as a potential ‘fifth column’ at home. In various public 
forums, citizens underlined their loyalty to the Soviet homeland and its titular ethnic groups. While it is 
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impossible to judge levels of genuine belief, these public articulations of Soviet patriotism shaped 
social and political dynamics in the USSR during the late 1960s. The ‘search for socialism’ that had 
animated state-society dynamics over the previous fifteen years was over in 1968. Instead, ethnically 
and geographically defined Soviet patriotism, often framed in xenophobic terms, became the main 
tool of social and political mobilisation in the USSR. 
      My analysis encompasses developments in Moscow, where the top Soviet leadership as well as 
members of the intelligentsia followed the Czechoslovak crisis in detail. But the chapter focuses in 
particular on Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine lay in the west of the USSR and it shared a border with 
Czechoslovakia.10 Its inhabitants were therefore very well-informed about the Prague Spring. In the 
borderland region of Transcarpathia, memories of Czechoslovak rule in the interwar period made the 
crisis seem very close to home.11 Moreover, the example of Czechoslovakia’s rising autonomy from 
Moscow followed by a military crackdown on Dubček’s reforms carried particular significance in the 
USSR’s non-Russian periphery, which itself had a complicated relationship with the Soviet centre in 
Moscow. 
 
Official Reactions 
The Prague Spring sparked a crisis of identity among the Soviet leadership. Throughout the first half 
of 1968, Brezhnev in particular was keen to salvage the idea that political and economic reform was 
possible in the Soviet bloc and, by extension, in the USSR itself. He was therefore reluctant to crack 
down on ‘socialism with a human face’ which promised to lend Soviet-style regimes new legitimacy. 
But other members of the Politburo were also painfully aware that Dubček’s reforms challenged 
Soviet-made visions of what it meant to be socialist. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 
pushed Soviet leaders to search for new sources of legitimacy at home and abroad, as attempts to 
involve citizens in debating and implementing policy were now associated with chaos and violence.  
      In conversations with Soviet diplomats in Prague in early 1968, Dubček presented his reforms as 
a fight against ‘violations of party discipline’, excessive bureaucracy and attempts to concentrate all 
political power in the hands of just one individual. These ideas echoed Brezhnev’s own slogans that 
helped him justify the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964.12 In January and February 1968, the Kremlin 
did not therefore express alarm at the unfolding events in Czechoslovakia. The tide turned in March 
when, concerned by the removal of former party leader Antonín Novotný from the office of president, 
major changes in Communist Party cadres and increasingly free mass media in Czechoslovakia, 
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Moscow issued a stern warning to Prague. Even then, members of the Politburo insisted that some of 
the most confrontational phrasing prepared by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the head of the 
KGB Yurii Andropov be dropped from the letter they drafted.13 An eyewitness recalled ‘long and 
heated’ arguments in the Soviet Politburo during deliberations on the Czechoslovak crisis.14 Top 
Soviet leaders were clearly at a loss about how to interpret Dubček’s policies. Prime Minister Alexei 
Kosygin, for example, was a very harsh critic of Czechoslovak reforms in March 1968, but seemed to 
take a more positive view of Dubček after a visit to Karlovy Vary in May. He continued to question the 
idea of a military intervention in Сzechoslovakia at Politburo meetings: 'We will take our armies in, 
and then what?'. Even in early August, shortly before the invasion, Moscow harboured hopes that the 
Čierná-nad-Tisou agreements would help to avoid open confrontation with Czechoslovakia.15 
      Soviet leaders knew that their own legitimacy was at stake in Czechoslovakia. Albeit highly critical 
of the mooted idea to introduce a multi-party system in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev still wanted 
inhabitants of the socialist camp to believe that communist parties and state institutions could bring 
more prosperity and opportunities for citizens to participate in power.16 In May 1968, the head of the 
Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgornyi was likewise alarmed that an overly heavy-handed approach in 
Czechoslovakia would convince 'enemies of socialism' that the system was broken.17 Further down 
the Communist Party hierarchy, after Khrushchev’s economic policies that had effectively devolved 
much decision making to the non-Russian republics were reversed in 1965,18 the Prague Spring was 
seen as a promising sign that political power might once again be de-centralised along national lines. 
Soviet Ukrainian party activists often travelled to Czechoslovakia in 1968 to gather information and 
influence Slovak politics in particular; many drew inspiration from the example of Slovakia 
successfully lobbying for more autonomy from Prague.19  
      Yet many influential Soviet leaders were early advocates of crushing Dubček’s reforms. The 
foreign ministry, along with the KGB and the GRU (the organisation in charge of Soviet 
reconnaissance operations), were the main channels through which Politburo members learned about 
events across the border. From November 1967, they painted a dark picture of Czechoslovak politics, 
raising alarm about the relaxation of censorship in Czechoslovakia which, in their view, weakened 
communist ideology. Equally important, they associated freedom of speech with the rise of anti-Soviet 
stereotypes, stressing that the Czechoslovak mass media presented Soviet people as ‘downtrodden 
and backward’.20 In contrast to the late 1950s and early 1960s, public debate was increasingly seen 
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not as a means of fostering faith in socialism, but rather as a threat to the unity of the Soviet bloc. 
Moscow was much more preoccupied with the lack of censorship and emerging political pluralism in 
Czechoslovakia than about Ota Šik’s explicitly market-oriented economic reforms.21  
      From the Kremlin's perspective, the political turmoil and new cultural openings of 1968 were a 
concern insofar as they threatened Czechoslovakia's place in the Warsaw Pact. The Defence Minister 
Andrei Grechko was especially worried about the spread of anti-Soviet propaganda among 
Czechoslovak soldiers.22 As the man who represented the Soviet Politburo in Prague during the 
invasion in August, General Kirill Mazurov, put it in an interview conducted over twenty years later: ‘[i]t 
was difficult for us to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic could take shape along our 
borders, one flooded with West Germans and behind them, Americans. This was totally incompatible 
with the interests of the Warsaw Pact’.23 Less commonly, Politburo members expressed concern 
about the infrequent Czechoslovak irredentist claims to Soviet territory. In June 1968, for example, the 
Politburo informed Prague about their outrage at the pamphlets they discovered in Czechoslovakia. 
Their authors claimed that the region of Transcarpathia, annexed by the USSR at the end of the 
Second World War, should be returned to Czechoslovakia.24 
      In the course of 1968, sceptical about the new participatory public culture across their western 
border, Soviet leaders grew ever more keen to constrain access to information and public debate in 
the USSR itself. The Ukrainian party boss Petro Shelest was especially vocal in condemning 
developments in Czechoslovakia, berating Brezhnev for indecisiveness during the crisis (later he 
even claimed that the Soviet First Secretary fainted when the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was 
taken).25 Like other leaders of territories bordering on Czechoslovakia, including W ładysław Gomułka 
in Poland and Walter Ulbricht in East Germany,26 Shelest was alarmed by the potential spillover of the 
Czechoslovak crisis. He thus called for suppressing the flow of information from Czechoslovakia into 
the USSR’s Ukrainian borderlands.27 The Soviet hardliners gained more traction with Brezhnev by 
mid-1968, as developments in Czechoslovakia seemed to slip out of Dubček’s control.28 The limits of 
permissible expression shrank accordingly. Czechoslovak and Romanian publications were subjected 
to Soviet censorship in the summer of 1968, even though books and newspapers from East European 
socialist countries had previously been free from such controls.29 Censorship control over Soviet 
publications also grew harsher as the Czechoslovak events unfolded.30  
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Search for Legitimacy  
The political and cultural shifts of 1968, however, did not just entail limiting citizens’ access to 
information. Rather, the Prague Spring sparked a search for redefining the USSR’s relationship with 
its allies in Soviet public culture. Soviet propaganda drew on a sense of great power pride and ethnic 
prejudices to justify the USSR’s continuing interference in Eastern Europe as it became clear that 
Soviet-style socialism had failed to create friendly relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. 
The prominence of geographically and ethnically-defined identities in Soviet public culture had far-
reaching implications for identity politics at home.   
      Even after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, officials in the USSR continued to 
present Soviet-style socialism as an ideology powerful enough to bridge national divisions and 
accommodate national differences. After a brief lull, the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society 
revived international travel between the two countries. In late 1968 and 1969, as Rachel Applebaum 
puts it, Soviet tourists visiting Czechoslovakia engaged in a quest for ‘mutual understanding’ with the 
Czechoslovak citizens they encountered.31 In order to justify the military invasion, the press frequently 
drew on the stock phrases about proletarian solidarities during official agitation meetings on 
Czechoslovakia.32 Still, painfully aware that citizens learned about the Czechoslovak crisis from 
foreign sources of information before the Soviet media,33 opinion leaders in the USSR were worried 
that slogans about international socialist friendship rang hollow in 1968. Czechoslovak broadcasts 
made it very clear that Dubček had a different interpretation of what it meant to be ‘socialist’ than his 
Soviet counterparts.34 Rifts in Soviet relations with the communist parties of France and Italy, as well 
as Romania and Yugoslavia, cast further doubt on the strength of friendly transnational ties grounded 
in a common ideological outlook.35 Before the invasion, with Czechs and Slovaks complaining about 
the USSR’s control over their natural resources, the KGB wrote of ‘peace and friendship’ as 
meaningless phrases that masked much more ‘messy’ international relations.36 Doubts about the 
power of ‘socialism’ to capture popular imagination multiplied in August 1968. Following the military 
intervention, participants in public agitation meetings provocatively asked lecturers to name the 
leaders in Prague who had supposedly asked the USSR for military assistance,37 as it became very 
clear that these pro-Soviet Czechoslovak socialist forces had failed to materialise.38 
      For the Soviet regime, socialism thus turned from a legitimating discourse into a contested idea 
and even a symbol of foreign policy failures. For those who saw Dubček as a committed Leninist, the 
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Soviet military intervention signalled deep rifts within the socialist movement. For those who believed 
that Czechoslovakia was overrun with counter-revolutionary forces, it was clear that Soviet-style 
socialism failed to spread across borders. This may partly explain why the Politburo approached the 
rhetoric of 'revolution' and 'communism' with great caution. In editing the appeal that pro-Soviet 
Czechoslovak forces sent to Brezhnev with a request for military assistance, Politburo members 
heeded the advice of the secretary in charge of ideology Mikhail Suslov and decided that it would be 
best not to refer to the alleged pro-Soviet Czechoslovak forces as 'revolutionary'. In another appeal 
written to citizens of Czechoslovakia on behalf of Warsaw Pact members concerned about the 
unfolding events in Prague, Soviet leaders addressed ‘workers’, ‘peasants’, ‘the national 
intelligentsia’, ‘Czechs’, and ‘Slovaks’, but decided to remove references to ‘communist party 
members’ as the progressive, pro-Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia.39 In defining 'us' versus 'them', the 
Politburo was more at ease with appealing to social and ethnic rather than political or ideological 
allegiances.  
      As the socialist ties that bound the USSR and Czechoslovakia were visibly shaken, the Soviet 
mass media evoked a sense of great power pride to justify the USSR’s continuing interference in 
Eastern Europe. In this way, the mounting crisis in Czechoslovakia marked a return to geographically 
and ethnically defined patriotism that had helped mobilise citizens behind Stalinist policies.40 Amir 
Weiner shows that the memory of the Second World War was particularly crucial for legitimising the 
USSR’s actions in Czechoslovakia.41 Moreover, the Soviet press defined the socialist camp as a 
union of closely-related Slavic nations, grounded in supposedly natural inborn affinities older than 
Soviet socialism.42 In line with these broader trends, the central Soviet newspaper Krasnaia zvezda 
(Red Star) described the concept of Central Europe as a hostile assault on natural affinities. The 
concern was that historians who wrote about ‘Central Europe’ implied that the Soviet satellite states 
(as well as western Ukraine) were part of the Habsburg and not the Russian historical sphere of 
influence.43 Although the Soviet Union’s satellite states included countries with non-Slavic majority 
populations, Soviet propaganda cast Eastern Europe as a predominantly Slavic community, united 
against German and Jewish outsiders. 
      Simplistic xenophobic slogans played an important role in Soviet public culture during 1968.  
According to Polish diplomats in Moscow, the anti-Semitic speech which Władysław Gomułka delivered after 
the student protests in Poland found great resonance in the USSR itself.44 Along with other statements 
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published in the USSR in the aftermath of the Polish student protests in March, the speech fanned the 
fear of '(West) German imperialism', 'Zionism', and 'cosmopolitanism' as destructive forces that 
threatened the Slavs of Eastern Europe.45 In the summer of 1968, the Soviet media continued to 
mobilise popular fears of German ‘revanchism’. They publicised proclamations by the organisations of 
Sudeten Germans who pressed the West German government not to recognise post-war borders, 
and emphasised that nationalists in Austria and West Germany would threaten the USSR itself if they 
gained control over Czechoslovakia.46 The Soviet news agency TASS framed the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia as part of an age-old European struggle for peace that predated the 
establishment of the USSR.47 
      Soviet propaganda raised anxieties about Czech and Slovak nationalism during 1968. Informing 
party activists about the unfolding developments in July 1968, for example, the Politburo wrote about 
the 'specificity' of Czechoslovakia and its communist party, underlining that the 'bourgeoisie' never 
emigrated after the establishment of socialism in the country in 1948. Class enemies had infiltrated 
the party and were now on course to restore capitalism in Czechoslovakia. The implication was clear: 
Czechs were inherently suspect, as even membership in the communist party was no sure sign of 
loyalty. In contrast, not only Soviet communists, but all 'Soviet people' were ready to defend 
revolutionary achievements.48 The language of socialism thus masked rather crude distinctions made 
on the basis of ethnicity and citizenship. Anti-Czechoslovak narratives were further promulgated after 
the invasion. For instance, the short documentary Counter-Revolution Shall Not Succeed 
(Kontrrevoliutsiia ne proidet), screened before feature films in Soviet cinemas, depicted foreigners 
across the border as dangerous radicals.49  
      Xenophobic incidents were likewise on the rise in late 1968 and 1969. When a group of sixty-one 
Czechoslovak miners and engineers from Ostrava came to Lviv to visit the Soviet soldiers whom they 
had supposedly befriended back home during the autumn of 1968, the trip took a nasty turn. One 
guest came up to a Czech woman who was dancing with a Soviet Army soldier, slapped her in the 
face and called her a ‘Russian swine’.50 Similarly, after the series of anti-Soviet demonstrations that 
followed the infamous USSR-Czechoslovakia ice hockey matches in March 1969, Soviet citizens 
attended special informational meetings. They learnt about crowds of angry protesters who destroyed 
Aeroflot offices in Prague and, even worse, vandalised monuments commemorating Soviet soldiers 
who had ‘liberated Czechoslovakia from fascism in 1945’. Although Dubček tried to dismiss these 
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actions as isolated cases of hooliganism, Soviet agitators insisted that anti-Soviet nationalism was in 
fact widespread in Czechoslovakia, with right-wing forces infiltrating such ‘socialist’ institutions as the 
official trade unions. Propaganda further played on Soviet fears of encirclement, emphasising that 
anti-Soviet sentiment in Czechoslovakia was promoted by the USA, West Germany and China.51 
      The shifts in Soviet public culture that occurred in 1968 had far-reaching implications for identity 
politics at home. Evoking the supposedly eternal and natural ethnic bonds among Slavs, Soviet 
leaders were intolerant of any expression of complex, multi-national borderland identities. From their 
perspective, every political-administrative unit in the Soviet bloc and each resident of the socialist 
camp could be described in unambiguous national terms. The Soviet authorities looked upon national 
minorities with suspicion at a time when the nation turned into the primary locus of identity. They thus 
hoped to see the Slovaks curtail the activities of the Ukrainian minority in eastern Slovakia, concerned 
that their interpretation of what it meant to be Ukrainian undermined state-approved narratives of 
Ukrainianness promoted within the USSR itself. The KGB was particularly alarmed by the revival of 
the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia because this institution, banned in the USSR, was seen 
as a vehicle for articulating Ukrainian identities defined in opposition to the Soviet state.52 From the 
Soviet perspective, Slovakia would be a much more reliable neighbour if it was simply Slovak rather 
than multi-national. On the Soviet side of the border, non-titular ethnic groups without their own 
national republics came under suspicion. Most prominently, after the 1967 Six Days War, the ethno-
centric turn in public culture fuelled anti-Semitic rhetoric in the USSR.53 During agitation meetings 
organised in 1968, participants asked many questions concerning the role of Jews in East European 
disturbances.54 For their part, likely in response to popular accusations of disloyalty, some Soviet 
citizens of Jewish origin found it important to emphasise publicly that they were in fact loyal to the 
USSR.55  As high-ranking Soviet officials such as Petr Demichev discussed both anti-Semitism and 
Zionism as problems plaguing the socialist camp, they revealed their own anti-Semitic prejudice: 
‘Zionist forces have become distinctly more active. The masses can feel it. In consequence, we can 
observe a backlash in the form of anti-Semitic moods’, Demichev claimed in a conversation with a 
Polish diplomat in Moscow, blaming the rise of anti-Semitism on the Jews themselves.56 Furthermore, 
some Soviet citizens of Polish and Czech origin found it expedient to publicly highlight their alienation 
from their rebellious ‘external homelands’ as ethnicity turned into a marker of loyalty.57 
 10 
      With the importance of geographically and ethnically defined patriotism on the rise, the limits of 
permissible national expression shrank even among the non-Russian ethnic groups which had their 
own nationally-designated republics in the USSR. This represented a major departure from Thaw-era 
policies. During the early 1960s, the party leadership in Ukraine was surprised by levels of resistance 
to Russification and attempts to curtail the rights of the republics. In order to avoid an open 
confrontation with dissidents and to increase their own autonomy from Moscow, some party officials 
sought legitimacy within their republic by presenting themselves as Ukrainian national leaders. These 
communists expected a measure of support from members of the Politburo in Moscow.58 In 1968, 
portrayals of the Prague Spring acted as a warning against over-emphasising Ukrainian 
distinctiveness in the USSR. Federalism in Czechoslovakia was hardly discussed in the Soviet 
Ukrainian press in 1968 and 1969, and it did not figure at all in public anti-Czechoslovak polemics. 
Reports from agitation meetings show that residents of the republic asked about the relationship 
between Czechs and Slovaks over and over again,59 but it seems that party activists found the subject 
too sensitive to discuss publicly.60 With the Slovaks striving towards greater autonomy in 
Czechoslovakia, the authorities wanted to prevent inhabitants of Ukraine from questioning the position 
of their own republic in the USSR. These developments fed into high politics in Soviet Ukraine. It is 
possible that Shelest’s vocal condemnation of Dubček’s reforms was an attempt to demonstrate to 
Moscow that his own limited endorsement of Ukrainian culture was different from Czechoslovak 
demands for more autonomy from Moscow.61 Still, developments in Czechoslovakia helped to 
discredit Shelest’s relatively liberal national policy. In contrast, his main rival in Kyiv Volodymyr 
Shcherbyts’kyi had no scruples about subordinating the republic’s interests to those of the Soviet 
state. As such, he was seen as more reliable by the Kremlin and his position in the Ukrainian party 
was strengthened during 1968.62  
 
A New Consensus 
The Brezhnev regime successfully redirected popular frustrations away from its own policies, and 
towards foreign and domestic ‘enemies’. Many citizens embraced the state’s patriotic rhetoric, rallying 
behind the Soviet state as a representative of their interests defined in opposition to ‘nationalists’ and 
‘imperialists’ abroad, as well as ethnic minorities at home. Expressions of Soviet patriotism did not 
necessarily reflect genuine belief, but they shaped the parameters of Soviet public culture in 1968.  
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      In various forums, as socialism turned into a contested notion during 1968, citizens underlined 
their loyalty to the Soviet vision of what it meant to be properly socialist. In May 1968, an engineer 
from Mukachevo, close to the Slovak-Ukrainian border, thus stated that his father had died in 
Czechoslovakia during the Second World War fighting for ‘a life without the rich’ for the Czechoslovak 
people. Now his achievements were being undermined, he despaired, because the Czechoslovak 
party was in no hurry to build socialism, and some of its members were even ‘anti-communist’.63 Two 
months later, а pensioner from the Sumy region in northern Ukraine claimed that Dubček’s 
democracy would mirror Masaryk and Beneš’s pre-war ‘bourgeois republic’, with the ‘working class’ 
condemned to ‘hunger, unemployment, executions and imprisonment’. It was necessary to increase 
‘revolutionary alertness’, he concluded.64  
      More often, however, public statements of support for the USSR’s policies in Czechoslovakia 
were underpinned by loyalty not to the party or the cause of building communism, but rather to the 
Soviet state framed in geographical and ethnic terms. Especially in the borderlands, Sovietness was 
defined in opposition to the supposedly threatening Czechs and Slovaks. In this vein, after 21 August 
two students from Uzhhorod wrote to their parents in Lviv and Kamianets-Podilskyi relaying rumours 
that the Czechs wanted Transcarpathia back.65 In preparation for what seemed to be impending war, 
some residents of Transcarpathia bought great quantities of soap, salt and matches, whilst others 
prepared to leave the region and escape eastwards.66 Fear of war, combined with memories of victory 
over Nazi Germany, framed citizens’ public declarations of loyalty to the Soviet Union. A villager from 
Transcarpathia described his outrage at the slanderous claims broadcast by the West German radio 
station Deutsche Welle which attacked ‘our party and state’. He followed this statement by an account 
of his native village in Volhynia, which was ‘burned to the ground’ by the Nazis, and ended by writing 
that (given the opportunity) he would avenge the death of his father.67 For many, Soviet policies had a 
distinctly personal dimension, as people who overtly supported the invasion of Czechoslovakia spoke 
about their friends and relatives in the army.68 The public seemed receptive to increasingly 
xenophobic official narratives in August 1968. According to local officials, inhabitants of Chernivtsi 
applauded the ‘heroic acts’ of the Soviet Army and reacted very vocally to images of ‘sabotage’ aimed 
at ‘our soldiers’ when they watched the propaganda film Counter-Revolution Shall Not Succeed.69 
      These statements were often painfully jingoistic and it is difficult to assess levels of genuine belief 
behind them. However, they should not be dismissed as mere conformity, for geographically and 
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ethnically defined Soviet patriotism also framed criticism of Soviet foreign and domestic policies. At a 
time when Moscow still considered a range of options in Czechoslovakia, some citizens reportedly 
expressed a desire for more decisive military measures to be implemented. During an informal 
conversation with his colleagues that was later related to the KGB, for example, a teacher from 
Transcarpathia argued that it was necessary to install a new leadership in Prague which could then 
request Soviet military assistance.70 It is, of course, hard to gauge how widespread such views were, 
and it is conceivable that Shelest devoted disproportionate attention to pro-interventionist sentiment in 
his reports in order to exert pressure on Moscow to suppress the Prague Spring. But similar 
statements were also recorded after the August invasion. Several participants in public meetings 
called for a still stricter policy in Eastern Europe, asking why the army did not invade Romania. The 
KGB classified such views as ‘criticism’.71 Citizens also articulated disappointment with the ‘softness’ 
of the Soviet occupation in Czechoslovakia.72 At agitation meetings in Zaporizhzhia, for example, 
members of the audience asked about the USSR’s failure to locate and destroy the underground 
radio stations in Czechoslovakia with all the advanced technology at its disposal.73 
      Citizens further expressed isolationist sentiments at odds with the USSR's continuing interference 
in East European politics. For example, the notion that the USSR should look after its own interests 
fuelled anti-war opinions in Soviet Ukraine. In correspondence with Moscow, Shelest reported the 
views of women collective farmers from a village in Transcarpathia who complained that their 
husbands were drafted into the army in the midst of spring field works, just because the Czechoslovak 
leaders were not able to cope with their own problems.74 Keen to ensure that citizens perceive Soviet 
socialism as a successful system with global appeal, some opinion leaders were alarmed when 
participants in public meetings suggested that Soviet interests did not coincide with those of the 
USSR’s socialist allies. In Poltava, for example, a non-party collective farmer stated that all of Eastern 
Europe ‘feeds off us’, echoing more widespread complaints about Soviet subsidies to the socialist 
satellite states,75 but he supposedly ‘understood his mistake’ after the deputy head of a local council 
visited the collective farm to explain the intricacies of ‘internationalist help’.76 Soviet patriotism defined 
in opposition to the socialist states of Eastern Europe helped citizens express diverse and even 
contradictory opinions about the desirable direction of the USSR's foreign policy. 
      Public discussions of the Czechoslovak crisis further provided a forum for criticising the Soviet 
mass media. Soviet institutions and the debates about the Prague Spring which they organised 
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allowed citizens to build social and political capital. Speakers at agitation meetings typically acted as 
leaders of public opinion at home, promising to ensure that members of their local communities would 
toe the official line.77 These self-proclaimed leaders of popular opinion sometimes criticised the Soviet 
authorities for failing to provide enough information about the unfolding events. After the publication of 
the speech by the Polish communist leader, Gomułka, in which he blamed Jews for student unrest in 
Poland, some citizens demanded that a similarly clear statement should be produced with regards to 
Czechoslovakia.78 During the highly-controlled public meetings held to discuss the Prague Spring, 
citizens further picked up on inconsistencies in Soviet mass media coverage of Czechoslovakia.79 
Some self-identified Soviet patriots claimed that incomplete information about the situation in 
Czechoslovakia was conducive to the appearance of harmful information and rumours.80 In July 1968, 
for example, the KGB reported that students, teachers and other employees of the Odessa civil 
engineering institute complained that the secrecy surrounding the Czechoslovak events fuelled the 
popularity of hostile foreign radio stations, proposing that newspapers should publish short 
information about the course of events on a day-to-day basis.81 They were not dissidents opposed to 
Brezhnev’s new course, and indeed they embraced the language of xenophobia that overcame the 
socialist camp in the late 1960s, but they still claimed the right to voice limited criticism of how 
Moscow handled information about the unfolding crisis.  
      From the Soviet leaders’ point of view, censorship was not a sufficient means of keeping the 
population in cheque. Soviet patriotism defined in geographical and ethnic terms provided a powerful 
legitimating discourse for Brezhnev at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis, but it also pushed the 
Kremlin to reflect on the need to find new ways of providing information to loyal and engaged citizens.    
 
Dissent 
Brezhnev’s fears that the crushing of Dubček’s reforms would shake popular faith in the ability of 
Soviet institutions to evolve and better represent society's interests were not entirely unfounded. The 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was an important impetus for the growth of the Soviet 
dissident movement, whose members no longer found it possible to work within the confines of official 
culture to achieve their political goals. 'Dissent' refers to those opinions that Soviet leaders classified 
not merely as ‘mistaken’ or ‘harmful’, but outright ‘illegal’. The KGB registered such dissenting voices 
among university students, members of the creative intelligentsia, soldiers and members of the 
Jewish minority, with most reports concentrating on citizens who did not belong to the communist 
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party.82 Dissidents were few and far between, but most expressed a surprisingly coherent set of 
views, arguing that the USSR’s great power nationalist politics represented a betrayal of socialist 
ideals. They sometimes echoed ‘loyal’ criticism of Soviet policy, criticising the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and calling for more information to be provided to citizens. However, dissident views 
were underpinned by the belief that Dubček, and not Brezhnev, had the right idea about how to fix 
Soviet-style regimes. Soviet leaders and dissidents themselves knew full well that such views were 
now firmly outside the limits of the permissible.  
      Soviet intellectuals concerned about creeping ‘re-Stalinisation’ of the socialist camp saw the 
Prague Spring as a rallying call for defending civic rights at home and abroad. Most famously, seven 
individuals gathered on Red Square in Moscow on 25 August 1968. They carried banners calling for 
the USSR to withdraw its armies from Prague, and underlining that they were fighting ‘for your 
freedom and ours’. The protesters were brutally punished: two ended up in a labour camp, three were 
exiled from Moscow and one was sent to a mental hospital. Natalia Gorbanevskaia, who was still 
breast-feeding her small child at the time, was released. She played a leading role in establishing and 
running the samizdat publication The Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika tekushchikh sobytyi).83 
Publicising statements by Soviet intellectuals and translations of Czechoslovak documents, The 
Chronicle turned into a source of news about the unfolding events at home and abroad and thus 
helped to shed dissent of its predominantly literary character in 1968.84  
      For Soviet dissidents, civic rights were tied intimately with freedom of speech. They drew on 
Khrushchev-era narratives of ‘citizenship’ (grazhdanstvennost’),85 bemoaning the fact that citizens’ 
ability to participate in politics was ever more severely curtailed. In an attempt to evaluate the 
Czechoslovak events, many samizdat materials emphasised that ‘freedom of expression’ was the 
only guarantee of democracy and economic progress in the Soviet bloc.86 They likewise warned ‘all 
citizens’ that silence had already led to one disaster: the rise of Stalinism.87 Dissidents thus 
emphasised that residents of the USSR had a social and political responsibility to criticise the party 
leadership, but they were far from questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet state as such. Rather, they 
imagined themselves as part of a distinctly ‘Soviet’ community of citizen-activists. In this vein, an 
inhabitant of Dnipropetrovsk complained about the lack of information concerning demonstrations in 
Poland and changes in Czechoslovakia in the official press and on television. He sarcastically 
recalled how Soviet leaders kissed Novotný in front of cameras earlier, yet now could not find words 
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to defend him (he suggested that perhaps they should have kissed him behind closed doors to make 
it more pleasant for everyone). His letter was very confrontational and he stated that the press was 
afraid to publish news from Eastern Europe lest Soviet students be inspired to protest against 
censorship, concentration camps or unfair trials.88  
      Dissent never translated into organised opposition to the Soviet state. But neither was post-
Prague non-conformity confined to a mere handful of Moscow intellectuals who published in samizdat. 
Liudmila Alekseeva documented several instances where citizens collected signatures under pro-
Dubček petitions or simply refused to vote on resolutions approving the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia at public meetings held across the USSR.89 The Ukrainian historian Volodymyr 
Dmytruk has also shown that views explicitly critical of Soviet policies in 1968 were registered 
throughout Soviet Ukraine.90 Sending anonymous letters and spreading illegal pamphlets, dozens of 
people embodied active resistance to the state’s attempts at curtailing public debate.91 Party and KGB 
reports suggested that many non-conformists in the provinces and in the non-Russian parts of the 
USSR saw themselves as part of the same culture of dissent as their Moscow counterparts, citing the 
example of a student from Lviv who claimed that her friends should follow the example of Moscow 
dissidents.92 
      Non-conformist critiques of Soviet policies in Czechoslovakia were often explicitly grounded in 
socialist ideas. As self-proclaimed ‘communists’,93 many samizdat authors underlined their 
commitment to Dubček’s reform socialism. They reprinted the Czechoslovak party's Action 
Programme from April 1968. The Soviet Union should learn how to build socialism from the Czechs - 
read the four leaflets discovered in Chernihiv on 24 August - as the struggle in Czechoslovakia was 
not a fight between communism and capitalism, but rather a battle between new and old ideas within 
socialism.94 For those citizens who believed that the Kremlin betrayed the socialist cause in 1968, real 
socialism was still embodied by some members of Brezhnev’s own team. An anonymous letter from 
Zhdanov (Mariupol) in the Donetsk region condemned the ‘bandit’ invasion of Czechoslovakia and 
Brezhnev’s ‘revisionist’ system, ending in gripping slogans: ‘Out with Brezhnev! Long live Kosygin!’95 
The authors did not explain why they held a positive opinion of the Soviet Prime Minister, but it is 
likely that they associated him with the abortive economic reforms of the mid-1960s which 
represented the last concerted attempt by the Kremlin to improve the functioning of Soviet 
institutions.96  
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      Underground publications attacked the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia as an 
expression of ‘imperialism’, quite unbecoming of a socialist state committed to de-colonisation and 
internationalist friendship.97 In this vein, in July 1968 a self-styled ‘group of honest communists’ 
penned an open letter expressing the hope that the USSR would not risk discrediting itself ‘by 
invading a brotherly country’.98 Such views were often underpinned by anti-capitalist sentiment and 
continuing faith that Soviet-style socialism offered an attractive alternative path to modernity. Official 
reports quoted dozens of individuals who claimed that the intervention would weaken the communist 
movement in the whole world.99  
      The national question acquired a new urgency for dissidents as the limits of permissible non-
Russian expression in the USSR shrank. Throughout the latter half of the 1960s, ‘ethnic minority 
samizdat championed “genuine socialism” and “the restoration of Lenin's norms”’ as a guarantee of 
greater national autonomy for republics in the USSR.100 In line with this, during the Prague Spring and 
its aftermath, some authors who published their views in the underground sought to defend ‘Ukrainian 
rights’, but also underlined their commitment to the Soviet Union and its official ideology. For example, 
an anonymous member of the Ukrainian writers’ union distributed a letter among Soviet citizens, in 
which he or she commented at length on the situation in Czechoslovakia, as well as complained that 
the Soviet authorities were prejudiced against Ukrainian culture. Although the author was critical of 
Soviet nationalities policy, he or she still appealed to an official Soviet institution, the writers’ union, to 
rectify the problem.101  
 
Anti-Soviet Nationalism 
It was mostly in the USSR’s western borderlands that some residents went further and rejected the 
Soviet state and socialism in its entirety, rather than calling for the reform of the system. On 27 
August, the Lviv regional party secretary claimed that ‘nationalist’ and anti-Soviet elements had 
intensified their hostile activities after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.102 At the height of 
the Prague Spring, the national solution was the most immediately obvious alternative to Soviet 
socialism for those citizens who rejected existing state structures. For instance, the KGB quoted a 
man from Stryi who claimed that the only way to solve the Czechoslovak problem was to grant 
‘freedom and independence’ to all peoples in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine.103 This type of  
dissidence was not new in 1968, but rather represented continuities from earlier Ukrainian nationalist 
resistance to the USSR which was now weaker than at any point since the (re-)establishment of 
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Soviet rule in the region during the Second World War.104 At least in the KGB’s view, explicitly anti-
Soviet attitudes were mostly confined to individuals who had already developed a hostile relationship 
with the central ? authorities, with many having spent time in the Gulag for nationalist resistance to 
Soviet rule during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.105 This suggests perhaps 
that the Prague Spring emboldened citizens with anti-Soviet convictions, but did not in fact increase 
the reach or affect the claims of anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism. 
      Anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism carried a range of different connotations. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that in some cases it framed explicit calls for inter-ethnic violence. For instance, a metal 
worker from Lviv boasted that he had identified a house belonging to a Russian man in order to 
occupy it during the coming war.106 For others, anti-Russian nationalism helped frame economic 
complaints. Immediately after the invasion, an employee of a furniture factory in Chernivtsi stated that 
the ‘Moskali’ (a derogatory term for Russians) prevented the people of Czechoslovakia from ‘living 
well’,107 and a local resident claimed that the Ukrainians would be richer had it not been for fifty years 
of ‘Muscovite oppression’.108 In some cases, nationalism was associated with support for private 
ownership. A woman employed at the bread factory in Uzhhorod stated that ‘the Russians take 
everything away’. At the suggestion that it was still better to live under the Russians than the 
Germans, she retorted that the Germans would ‘give people their land’.109 Finally, anti-Soviet 
Ukrainian nationalism helped citizens articulate opposition to religious oppression in the USSR. In 
particular, the legalisation of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia during 1968 emboldened 
some faithful in Ukraine to call for similar measures at home.110 
 
Conclusion 
The Prague Spring marked a shift in Soviet identity politics. The events of 1968 made it abundantly 
clear that socialist allegiances were not tantamount to loyalty to the Soviet state and its titular ethnic 
groups. In the search for popular legitimacy, leaders of the USSR downplayed the internationalist 
ideas of the previous decade, when Khrushchev sought to rekindle popular faith in socialism as an 
ideology that united class-conscious, ideologically-committed people across borders. This is because 
the idea that socialist institutions would involve citizens in debating and implementing policy, or that 
socialism would help to construct a new type of international relations based on anti-imperialist 
commitments, was largely discredited by 1968.  
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      Expression of ‘socialist’ identities was now largely confined to underground culture. The few, but 
surprisingly, vocal proponents of reform turned to illegal means such as unsanctioned 
demonstrations, underground publications and illegal pamphlets to defend the now largely abandoned 
de-Stalinisation agenda. They called for ‘openness’ and ‘spiritual renewal’ of Soviet society, 
demanded a return to ‘Leninist’ nationalities policy and criticised Brezhnev’s ‘imperialist’ foreign 
policy. Bar a few scattered calls for independence from the USSR in the western borderlands, 
dissenting voices did not normally echo ideas of anti-Soviet nationalism or a sense of cultural and 
historical distinctiveness that Amir Weiner focuses on in his study of territories incorporated into the 
USSR after 1939.111 Rather, dissent was mostly grounded in a sense of Soviet patriotism that 
underpinned demands for political representation, access to information and freedom of speech. The 
geography of dissent in 1968 did not therefore conform to the stereotypical division into unstable 
borderlands and a compliant centre. This may partly explain why, some twenty years later, ideas 
about reforming socialism inspired by the Prague Spring entered the USSR’s mainstream culture as 
Mikhail Gorbachev sought once again to radically overhaul the Soviet system.112 
      Yet it would be a mistake to assume that citizens lost faith in the ability of the Soviet state to 
represent their interests because they could no longer debate what socialism was or what 
communism should be; or to argue that residents of the USSR only remained acquiescent due to 
Brezhnev’s material handouts.113 After the Prague Spring buried the Soviet Thaw, many inhabitants of 
the USSR did not see the Soviet state as an ‘aging revolution’ that had lost its impetus, but rather as 
an embodiment of their ethnically and geographically defined interests.114 Although it is impossible to 
judge levels of genuine belief behind public statements of approval for Soviet foreign policy in 1968, 
ethnically and geographically defined Soviet patriotism was a powerful tool that helped citizens 
manifest their patriotic credentials and thus improve their social standing and even to voice limited 
criticism of official policy. 
      Far from signalling the beginning of ‘stagnation’, the Czechoslovak crisis pushed Soviet leaders to 
search for new ways of shaping state-society dynamics in the USSR. The Prague Spring highlighted 
the urgent need to develop Soviet television that would help isolate citizens from harmful foreign-
produced information and ideas.115 After the upheavals of 1968, Soviet and East European leaders 
did not close borders between the USSR and its satellite states. On the contrary, transnational 
cultural and social ties grew over the 1970s. As faith in the power of socialism to bind the USSR and 
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its allies crumbled, Soviet media professionals developed new types of popular culture that lent 
Eastern Europe a great degree of cultural integrity, and East European organisations developed ties 
and infrastructure that allowed for the rise of international tourism on an unprecedented scale. But 
Eastern Europe was increasingly defined not as a 'socialist commonwealth' united by left-wing values 
and ideas, but rather as a confederation of closely related ethnic groups that looked to Moscow for 
protection against Western European and American aggression.116 
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